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the Windstanley and Shopert cases as stating the same rule.14 Thus the
law that was supposedly settled became again unsettled. With the law in
this state, in a relatively recent case, the Supreme Court definitely adopted
the rule as stated in the Windstmney case1 5 and the later cases have followed this view.16 In one case the opinion is misleading as to which rule
is being followed but the result seems to be in accord with the settled
view.17 At the present time the law in Indiana on this point is apparently
settled as stated in the principal case as to banks acting as trustee and
becoming insolvent before March 11, 1931. If any bank acting as trustee
should become insolvent after that date, a statute declares that the fund
held in trust shall be a preferred claim over general creditors.18 There is
a more recent case which cites with approval the principal case without
J. W.
stating its holding.19
WoRx AN'S COMPENSATION-ARISING OUT OP THE EMPLOYMLNT-The
appellant alleged that, on the 14th day of April, 1931, he received certain
personal injuries by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment in the appellee's factory, by reason of which he lost his
left eye. When no agreement, as to compensation, could be reached, the
appellant filed his application with the Industrial Board, on account of said
injuries, on the 5th day of June, 1931, and was heard by a single member
of the board, who found in favor of the appellant. The appellee on the 28th
day of October, 1931, filed an application for a review by the full board,
which found that the appellant's alleged accidental injury was not the
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The appellant appealed, assigning as error that "the finding and order of
the Full Industrial Board is contrary to law." Hed, the accidental injury
did not cause the disability of the appellant.'
The court, without an analysis of the causal relation of the accident,
the injury and the employment, affirmed the award of the Industrial Board
by following the rule, that, where there is some evidence to support the
finding, the award is conclusive, if there has been proper notice and a full

"State v).Farmers& Merchants Nat. Bank (1919), 71 Ind. App. 216, 124 N. E.
501.

0 Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. v. American State Bank (1925), 196 Ind. 118,

147 N. E. 524.

1Crowder, Rec., v. Sanduscy (1929), 91 Ind. App. 200, 170 N. E. 792; Allen
SSteen Acceptance Co. v. Cook, Rec. (1930), 93 Ind. App. 682, 173 N. E. 460;
Crowder v. Abbott (1931), 178 N. E. 860; Mock v. Stultz (1932), 179 N. E. 561;
Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 181 N. E. 369.
ST~tults, Ree., 'v. Gordon, Adm. (1929), 89 Ind. App. 611, 167 N. E. 564.
"8Acts 1931, Chapter 167, page 580. That hereafter, upon the insolvency, suspension or liquidation of any bank of discount and deposit, or loan and trust and
safe deposit company, while acting as executor, administrator, receiver, guardian,
assignee, commissioner, agent, attorney-in-fact, or in any other fiduciary capacity,
the person or persons beneficially entitled to receive the property and proceeds held
in trust by it as aforesaid, or its successors In trust, shall have preference and
priority over its general creditors in all assets of such bank or loan and trust and
safe deposit company, for all uninvested funds so held in trust to the extent of any
commingling with its general assets or which may iiot be duly accounted for.
"Rottger v. Delta Delta Delta Realty Corporation (1933), 184 N. E. 412.
'Hess v. Ohlen Bishop Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, Dec. 15, 1932. 18&
N. E. 387.
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hearing before an impartial tribunal, acting within the scope of its authority.2 The conclusiveness of the Industrial Board's award, if based on a
3

proper procedure and a proper application of the law, is supported by the
decisions, which hold that the awards of similar bodies are conclusive, where
there has been a proper procedure before an impartial tribunal.4
The class of injuries, contemplated by the Indiana Compensation Act,5
is a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. A personal injury to be compensable must result from an accident, and the acci-lent must "arise out of the employment." The word accident, as used in
this act, is used in the popular sense, and means any unlooked for mishap
The courts, by a liberal
or untoward event not expected or designed.6

construction of the meaning of the word accident, have included many types
of injuries within the compensation statutes. The following examples are
7
injuries received as a result of an assault and batillustrative: strains;
9
tery;S drowning; burnsitis or "house maid's" knee, which results from the
workman's being on his knees for several days scraping the 11oor;lO sunstroke;11 inhaling of gas fumes;12 drinking contaminated water, furnished
2

nternational Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm, (1930), 280 U. S. 291, 50 Sp.
Ct. 89; Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. va. Glidden (1931), 284 U. S. 151, 52
Sp. Ct. 69; Tagg Bros. and Moorhead va. United States (1929), 280 U. S. 420, 50
Sp. Ct. 220; Phillips v'. Commonwealth (1930), 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sp. Ct. 608; Bell
v. Hayes Ionia Co. (1916), 192 Mich. 90, 158 N. W. 179; Bergstrom v. Industrial
Comm. (1918), 286 Il. 29, 121 N. B. 195.
3 Noble v. Union River Logging Co. (1892), 147 U. S. 165, 13 Sp. Ct. 271; Western Chemical Co. va. United States (1925), 271 U. S. 268, 46 Sp. Ct. 500; Chicago &
R. L & Pao. B. B. Co. va. United States (1927), 274 U. S. 29, 47 Sp. Ct. 486; Virginia B. B. Co. v. United States (1928), 272 U. S. 658, 47 Sp. CL 222.
'Meeker 'a. Lehigh Valley B. B. Co. (1914), 236 U. S. 412, 35 Sp. Ct 337; Mills
va. Lehigh Valley B. B. Co. (1914), 238 U. S. 473, 35 Sp. Ct. 888; Spiller v. Atch. &
Santa Fe B. B. Co. and Others (1919), 253 U. S. 117, 40 Sp. Ct. 466; Old Colony
Trust Co. va. Comm. (1929), 279 U. S. 716, 49 Sp. Ct. 499 (Bd. Tax. App.); Virginia R. B. Co. va. United States (1926), 272 U. S. 658, 47 Sp. Ct. 222 (I. C. .) ;
Fed. Trade Comm. v,. Eastman Kodak Co. (1927), 274 U. S. 619, 37 Sp. Ct. 688;
Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States (1928), 277 U. S. 551, 48 Sp. Ct. 140,
5Burns' Revised Statutes, 1926, Section 9447.
8
Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown (1917), 67 Ind. App. 178, 117 N. E. 555;
Fenton. v. Thorley Co. (1913), App. Cas. 443; Boody, Administratorv. K and C. Co.
(1914), 77 N. H. 208, 90 At. 859; Vennen va. New Dells Lumber Co. (1915), 161
Wis. 370, 154, N. W. 640; Adams va. Acme Co. (1914), 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W.
485; Southwestern, etc., Co. v. Pillsbury (1916), 172 Cal. 768, 158 Pac. 762.
7
Puritan Bed Springs Co. va. Wolfe (1918), 68 Ind. App. 330, 120 N. E. 417;
Terre Haute Malleable Co. v. Wehrle (1921), 76 Ind. App. 656, 132 N. E. 698.
S Ohio Bldg. Safety Vault Co. v. Ind. Comm. (1917), 277 fl1. 96, 115 N. E. 149;
Polar Ice and Fuel Co. v. Mulray (1918), 67 Ind. App. 270, 119 N. E. 149; Heidman
v. American Dist. Tel Co. (1921), 230 N. Y. 205, 130 N. E. 302; Dean v. Stockham (1929), (Ala.), 123 So. 225.
9Bundy v. State Highway Commission (1929), (Vt.), 146 AtL 68.
nStandard Cabinet Co. v. Ind. Board (1921), 76 Ind. App. 593, 132 N. E. 661.
2Lane va. Horn and Hardart Brick Co. (1918), 261 Pa. 329, 104 AtI. 615;
Daughtery's Case (1921), 238 Blass. 456, 131 N. B,. 167; Murray v. Cummings
Constr. Co. (1921), 232 N. Y. 507, 134 N. E. 549.
"NXaud v. King Serving Machine Co. (1916), 233 N. Y. 567, 119 N. E. 1061;
Tinctic Milling Co. v. Ind, Comm. (1922), 60 Utah 14, 206 Pae. 278; Traveler's Ins.
Co. v. Smith (1924), 266 S. W. 574. Contra: Meade Fiber Corp v. Starnes (1923),
147 Tenn. 362, 247 S. W. 989; Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge Co. (1929), 276 Pac.
89; Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Kerr (1924), 203 Ky. 804, 263 S. W. 342.
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by the employer, which results in typhoid fever; 1 3 pneumonia, which results
from a weakened condition of the body due to an injury.14 and where germs
enter the body through the broken fissures of the skin.15
Before an accident can be said to "arise out of the employment" there
must be a certain causal connection between the employment and the accident. In re McNichols,16 it was stated that it "arises out of the employment," when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of
all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is to be done and the resulting injury. If the injury can be
seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been
contemplated by a reasonable person, familiar with the whole situation, as
a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then
it "arises out of the employment." The personal injury must be the result
of the employment and flow from it as the inducing proximate cause and
the rational mind must be able to trace the resultant personal injury to a
proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not by some other
7
agency.1
This statement of the causal relation seemingly excludes any
injury, which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workman
would have been equally exposed irrespective of the employment; and demands that the causative danger be incidental to and peculiar to the work
and not common to the neighborhood. This was the early and the most
strict view, as illustrated by the so-called "street cases," which denied
recovery on the ground that the members of the public similarly situated
1
were likewise exposed. 8 However, it was not long until exceptions were
made in the case of those employees, who were forced to continually use the
19
streets, the dangers of which were common to all.
The more liberal and

the prevailing view disregards the frequency of the use of the streets and
allows recovery, even though the employee is required to be upon the street
2
only occasionally. 0
3Vennen v. New Delles Lumber Co. (1915), 161 Wis. 370, 154 N. W. 640;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Portland Gas & Coke Co. (1916), 229 Fed. 552.
U Bergstrom v'. Ind. Comm. (1918), 286 fI1. 29, 121 N. E. 195; Anderson v. Ind.
Comm. (1921), 116 Wash. 421, 199 Pac. 747; Robertson a'. Ind. Ace. Comm. (1925),
114 Ore. 394, 235 Pac. 684.
"Hart v. Wilson (1919), 227 N. Y. 554, 124 N. E. 898; Connelly v).Hunt Furniture Co. (1925), 240 N. Y. 83, 147 N. E. 366.
1(1913), 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697.
"In re Madden (1913), 222 Mass. 487, 111 N. E. 379; Kokomo Steel and Wire
Co. va. Ind. Board (1923), 81 Ind. App. 610, 141 N. E. 796; Mueller Constr. Co. .
Ind. Board (1918), 283 III. 148, 118 N. B. 1028; Rayner v. Sligh (1914), 180 Mich.
168, 146 N. W. 665.
IRead
v. Baker L. R. (1916), 1 K1 B. 927; Colarullo v. Woodland Golf Club
(1927), (Mass.), 155 N. E. 425.
1Larke v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 303, 97 At. 320;
State Camp. Ins. Fund v. Ind. Ace. Comm. (1924), 194 Cal. 28, 227 Pac. 168; Re
Harraden (1917), 66 Ind. App. 298, 118 N. E. 142; Capital Paper Co. v. Conner
(1924), 81 Ind. App. 545, 144 N. D. 474; Gardner's Case (1924), 247 Mass. 308,
142 N. E. 247.
2*Kunze
v. Detroit Shade Tree Co. (1916), 192 Mich. 435, 158 N. W. 851; Globe
Indemnity Co. -v. Ind. Comm. (1917), 36 Cal. App. 288, 171 Pac. 1088; Mueller
Constr. Co. v. Ind. Board (1918), 283 Il. 148, 118 N. E. 1028; Empire Health and
Accident Co. v. Purcell (1921), 76 Ind. App. 551, 132 N. E. 664; Stockley -a. School
District (1925), 231 Mich. 523, 204 N. W. 715; Palmer v'. Main, (1925), 209 Kr.
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The same causative principles, which apply to the street accident cases,
apply to the lightning cases. In Netherington P. Lightning DeliveM Com2
pa y, 1 in which the employee was killed while driving a truck from a low
to a higher sea level, recovery was denied, because such accident in no sense
"arose out of the employment" or was incidental thereto. However, in an
analogous case, 2 2 compensation was allowed, when an employee, who was
working on a scaffold, was struck by lightning. It was argued that the
employee would not have been struck had he not been where he was at the
time. Therefore the employment was the cause in fact. Whether it was also
the legal cause will depend upon whether or not the lightning should be regarded as such an independent intervening agency as to constitute a superceding cause. It should not be so regarded, if it was reasonably foreseeable, as a hazard of the employment. Therefore, if the employment is of
such nature as to increase the chances of injury by lightning, it should be
compensable as "arising out of the employment." In a California decision, 2 3 the liberal and what seems to be the most logical view and the present tendency was aptly presented: "Where one in the course of his employment is reasonably required to be at the particular place at that particular
time, and there meets with an accident, such accident 'arises out of the
employment' although any other person at such a place would have met
with such accident, irrespective of the employment." Other injuries due to
the elements are subject to almost the same analysis. Thus injuries due to
freezing "arise out of the employment" if, because of the employment and
the conditions under which the work is done, the employee is peculiarly
exposed to severe weather and the hazards of the elements are thereby
24
increased.
The principles of legal causation also control recovery for injuries due
to assault and battery by fellow employees or strangers. 2 5 If the altercation and subsequent injuries arise over the work, the injury "arises out of
the employment." Although the assault of the employee is an intervening
agency, but for which the injury would not have occurred, yet it is foreseeable that men will quarrel over their work and be provoked to assault.
Had it not been for the employment, there would have been no occasion for
this particular group to be together and there would have been no occasion
for the altercation. Therefore the employment furnished the reason, the
time and the place for such an event. This causal relation was clearly depicted in Dean v. Stockham,26 in which a night watchman was killed. The
employment involved the employee's being alone on the premises with his
wages in his pocket, thus furnishing an opportunity for the robbery without interference, a risk to which he would not have been equally exposed
apart from the employment.
226, 272 S. W. 736; Dennis v. White (1917), App. Cas. 479; Bookman v. Lyle Culvert Road Equipment Co. (1922), 153 Mlinn. 479, 198 XN. W. 894; Zabriskie v. Erie
R. P. Co. (1914), 82 N. J. L. 266, 92 AtM 385.
21(1927), (Ariz.), 258 Pac. 306.

2Andrew v. Fainsworth Society (1904), 2 *- B. 32.
=Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ind. Comm. (1927), 254 Pac. 995.

24

Larke v. John Hancockz Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1916),

90 Conn. 303, 97 AtI.

320.
35Hedman v. American Dist. Tel. Co. (1921), 230 N. Y. 305, 130 N. E. 302;
Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Ind. Board (1917), 277 Ill.96, 115 N. 11. 49.
' (1929), (Ala.), 123 So. 225.
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A similar problem is involved in the so-called "horse play" cases. Many
courts deny recovery in such cases on the ground that the activities of the
fellow workers engaged in "horse play" are independent, intervening agencies and are unforeseeable, and therefore break the chain of causation between the employment and the injury so that the injury cannot be regarded
as "arising out of the employment." 2 7 It is submitted that Judge Cardozo
in a New York decision 2 S recognized such a causal relation between the
employment and the injury in the "horse play" cases and followed the most
logical and the better rule, when he stated that the test of liability under
the workman's compensation statute is not the master's dereliction. The
test of liability is the relation of the service to the injury, of the employment to the risk, and that the risks of such associations were the risks of
the employment. This test seems very persuasive, since it is a matter of
common knowledge to everyone, who employs labor, that there is always
a certain amount of risk from practical jokes, when men and boys are to9
gether in groups, even while working.2
Therefore it seems that, regardless of the kind or class of injury, a personal injury to come within the compensable class, as "arising out of the
employment, must have resulted from an accident and must have been legally caused by the employment; and that, when this condition exists, the
test, laid down in re McNichols,3o applies.
The principles of causation hitherto discussed are likewise applicable to
the instant case. The appellee admits that the employment was the cause
in fact of the accident, but denies the appellant's claim that the accident
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury complained of. The Industrial Board found that there was some evidence to support the appellees
contention. Therefore, for the appellant to recover compensation, it was
necessary for him to prove not only that the accident was the legal or
proximate result of the employment and flowed from it as the inducing legal or proximate cause, but to prove that the accident was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury complained of.
J.H. H.
3'Payne v. Industrial Comm. (1920), 295 I1L 388, 129 N. E. 122; Coronado
Beach Companyv . Pillsbury (1916), 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212.
Leonbruno v. Cham lain Silk Mills (1920), 229 N. Y. 47, 128 N. E. 711.
-2'HulleyV. Mossbuegger (1915), 87 N. 3. L. 103, 93 AtI. 79.
30Supra, Note. 16.

